Loyola Consumer Law Review
Volume 5 | Issue 3

Article 10

1993

Medical Profession Liable Under the Illinois
Consumer Fraud Act
Laura M. Zubor

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Laura M. Zubor Medical Profession Liable Under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 5 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 96 (1993).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr/vol5/iss3/10

This Recent Case is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola Consumer Law Review
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

Recent Cases
evidence to allow a claim of fraud
against Bearden go before a jury.
Among the evidence that the Developers produced were sworn affidavits
stating that they would receive the
multi-million dollar loan along with
the $1 million in exchange for the IEC
Building. The affidavits also stated
that at the closing, Bearden failed to
disclose that Mainland would not provide the loan. The Developers also
submitted a letter from Walker to Mainland, in which Walker clarified expectations the parties expected to see in
writing at the closing.

General Business Law
Regulates Insurance

Judgment Affirmed for Remaining
Claims
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit found
that the Developers' evidence did not
create an issue of material fact for the
fraud claim against Hill. The court
stated that their evidence of Hill's surprise of the loan problem and Hill's
response that he would take care of the
situation did not support the allegation
that he committed fraud. Similarly,
the appellate court did not find sufficient evidence regarding the conspiracy
claims against both defendants to allow
a jury decide the issue.
The court also affirmed the district
court's judgment in favor of Bearden
and Hill on claims under the Act. The
appellate court stated that an action
under the Act required the Developers
to establish that they were consumers
seeking or acquiring "by purchase or
lease, any goods or services." Furthermore, where the borrower fails to allege a complaint regarding the items he
intended to acquire with the loan, the
Texas courts have ruled the complainant is not a consumer and therefore has
no right to sue under the Act. Thus,
since the Developers failed to allege a
complaint regarding the specific project
they intended to fund with the loan,
they were not consumers within the
scope of the Act. Accordingly, the
Fifth Circuit affirned the dismissal of
this claim. 40
Christine Cody

Burned in More than One Way
In 1988, John Riordan and his wife,
Jane Fox, (the "Riordans") purchased a
homeowner's insurance policy from
Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance
("Nationwide") for their home in
Ossining, New York. The policy guaranteed the replacement cost of the building and its contents in the event of loss.
On July 17, 1989, a fire occurred at the
home, destroying most of the house
and the personal property it contained.
The Riordans notified Nationwide
and hired Steven Seltzer, an insurance
adjuster, to assist them with theirclaim.
John Hahn, Nationwide's claims adjuster, visited the site two days after the
fire and obtained a contractor's estimate for the repair cost of the damage.
The Riordans submitted an inventory
list to Hahn. Hahn, however, failed to
authorize the start of any repairs.
Eventually, the Riordans had the
damaged effects cleaned and restored.
Nationwide never sent a representative
to evaluate the damages to those items,
despite persistent requests. The Riordans
submitted a timely Proof of Loss form,
listing only the irreparably damaged
items.
Nationwide advanced $25,000 to
the Riordans on the building portion of
the claim. Nationwide stipulated, however, that the Riordans could not use
the money for housing repairs without
the prior approval of Citibank, the
mortgagee of the property. Because
Citibank would not release the money
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Company's DeceptiveActs
In Riordan v. Nationwide Mutual
Fire Insurance, 977 F.2d 47 (2nd Cir.
1992), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a
New York law prohibiting deceptive
practices in business conduct applied to
insurance companies. Additionally,
the court stated that in appropriate
cases, the insured can recover attorney
fees.

until the building portion of the claim
was fully settled, the Riordan's could
not live in the unrepaired structure.
Although the parties attempted to
settle, Nationwide refused to discharge
the building part of the claim unless the
Riordans accepted the offer for the
contents portion as well. Since
Nationwide's offer for the contents
was approximately $21,000 and the
Riordan's sought more than $160,000,
the Riordans rejected the all-or-nothing settlement offer.
Suit For ContractBreach and
Deceptive Acts
The Riordans filed suit against Nationwide in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New
York. They alleged that Nationwide
violated § 349 of New York's
McKinney's General Business Law (the
"Law") by breaching their insurance
contract and committing deceptive acts
and practices in the claims settlement
process. The Riordans sought compensatory and punitive damages as well as
attorney fees. The district court entered a judgment in favor of the
Riordans on their breach of contract
claim.
At trial on the deceptive acts issue,
the jury returned a verdict in favor of
the Riordans, awarding sums for repair
of the house, damage to the contents,
and living expenses. In addition, the
jury awarded $1,000 for the deceptive
acts and practices violations and
$150,000 in punitive damages. The
court also awarded attorney fees. Nationwide appealed the judgment to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.
General Business Law Binds
Insurance Companies
Nationwide first asserted that New
York's Law did not apply to insurance
companies since various state statutes
already extensively regulated unfair
and deceptive practices within the industry. The Second Circuit rejected
Nationwide's reasoning because it
found that § 349 clearly stated it ap95
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plied to all deceptive practices, regardless of whether they were subject to any
other state law. Furthermore, the court
noted that the statute did not provide an
exception for insurance companies.
Nationwide then contended that the
legislature, in enacting § 349, did not
intend the deceptive practices at issue
to be subject to the statutorily created
private right of action. Instead, Nationwide argued that the legislature
designed the statute to cover retailers or
small claims. The Second Circuit,
however, found no such restrictions in
the statute and held that since all consumers were subject to deceptive practices, all were protected by the statute.
Next, Nationwide challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the jury's verdict. The court stated that
the Riordans had presented adequate
evidence indicating that Nationwide
engaged in deceptive acts. The court
specifically noted Nationwide's:
(1) failure to acknowledge correspondence from the Riordans; (2) requirement of a Proof of Loss statement
without justification; (3) objection to
Riordan's inventory merely because it
was not on a Nationwide form; (4)
failure to respond to the Proof of Loss
statement; and (5) requirement that the
contents and building loss claims be
settled together presented adequate evidence for the verdict. Furthermore, the
Riordans demonstrated that Nationwide
engaged in similar deceptive practices
against other policyholders, thereby
meeting the statute's requirement of
recursive conduct or conduct affecting
the general public.
Attorney Fees Held Appropriate
The Law's § 349(h) permits a court
to award a prevailing plaintiff reasonable attorney fees. Nationwide argued
that attorney fees were inappropriate
because the Riordan' s attorneys did not
submit contemporaneous time records
throughout the case. The Second Circuit denied Nationwide's contention,
noting that New York courts rejected the
rule that reconstructed time records could
not be used as a basis for compensation.
96

Nationwide next argued that the
district court abused its discretion by
awarding legal fees. The Second Circuit, however, found no abuse of discretion noting that the district court
limited the amount of attorney fees to
half of the damages awarded, approximately $38,000 less than the Riordans
requested.
Punitive Damages a State Court
Issue
Nationwide contended that New
York Insurance Law preempted an
insured's recovery of punitive damages from an insurance company based
on unfair and deceptive claims practices. In the alternative, Nationwide
argued that the Riordans had not presented sufficient evidence to support
the award of punitive damages. The
Second Circuit, however, did not decide these issues, but rather remanded
them to New York's highest state court
for determination. 4-

B. James Slater, Jr.

Medical Profession Liable
Under the Illinois

Consumer Fraud Act
In Gadson v. Newman, 807 F. Supp.
1412 (C.D. Ill. 1992), the United States
District Court for the Central District
of Illinois found that the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch.
1211/2, para. 261 (1991), applied to
medical professionals engaging in
fraudulent conduct. Furthermore, the
court held that a fraudulent commercial contract for medical services between a hospital and a clinic was an
unfair trade practice and therefore violated the State Consumer Fraud Act.
Contract Deceives Health Care
Consumers and Promotes Unfair
Trade
Dr. Richard L. Newman practiced
psychiatric medicine through the cor-

poration of Newman Clinic Ltd
("Clinic"). Newman and his psychiatric clinic contracted with St. Mary's
Hospital ("SMH") to manage SMH's
psychiatric units and to establish inpatient psychiatric programs. Under the
contract, Newman's Clinic would develop treatments for patients in the
program and would approve all psychiatrists. The agreement further provided that physicians from SMH and
from the Clinic could refer patients to
the program. In addition, for each
patient referred by the Clinic staff who
was admitted to the SMH program,
SMH agreed to pay Newman's Clinic
an added fee of $90 per day.
Dr. Michael T. Gadson, director of
the psychiatric family unit at SMH,
sought relief against SMH and Newman
under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act
(the "Act") for conspiracy to commit
consumer fraud in federal court. Gadson
claimed that the contract promoted
unfair trade practices by excluding
Gadson and other health care competitors from the arrangement, resulting in
increased medical costs to the community. He further alleged that Newman's
undisclosed financial incentive to admit patients to the SMH program and to
prescribe additional medical procedures
to be performed at SMH deceived local
health care consumers. Finally, Gadson
asserted that the arrangement promoted
illegal and unethical self-referrals. In
response, SMH and Newman moved to
dismiss Gadson's claims, arguing that
the Act did not apply to the medical
profession.
Agreement Constitutes a
Commercial Aspect of Medicine
The federal district court first noted
that the Act's purpose is "[t]o protect
consumers.., against fraud or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of
any trade or commerce." SMH and
Newman argued that they could not be
sued under the Act since the medical
profession does not engage in "trade or
commerce." The court, however, rejected this argument, relying upon federal and state court cases as well as
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